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MAC RA:
EMERGING FROM THE THICKET
by David M Heller*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, healthcare reform has roiled domestic politics in the United States.
Issues of insurance coverage, drug pricing, healthcare delivery, and the role of the state
deeply divided the country's political parties and living rooms. However, one area of
reform maintains broad bipartisan consensus: physician reimbursement reform.
Healthcare expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") continue
to rise at unsustainable levels, 1 leading to serious questions about the sustainability
of the Medicare Trust Fund. The Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement system
currently operates predominantly through a Fee-For-Service ("FFS") structure, where
the government reimburses providers for each individual procedure. FFS is perceived
as a major contributor to the exponential increase in healthcare expenditures over
recent decades. 2
In 2015, Congress sought to reign m FFS expenditures and improve physician
reimbursement by passing the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015
("MACRA"). MACRA leverages multiple policy initiatives and incentivizes providers
through a payment structure that is commonly referred to as "value-based care." Valuebased care rewards positive clinical outcomes rather than providing payment based
on volume. However, as exhibited by similar programs in the past, uneven regulatory
implementation threatens to foil MACRA's efficacy.

* David Heller is Corporate Counsel at Greenway Health, a leading provider of health information
technology to ambulatory healthcare practices. He is also a member of the Executive Committee
of the Electronic Health Records Association (EHRA.). The opinions expressed in this Article are
solely those of 11r. Heller, and do not reflect the views of Greenway Health, the EHRA, or any other
entity or individual. The author would like to thank Debbie J. Alfstad, the practice administrator
of the Retina Institute of Texas, PA. for her contribution to this article with respect to health
information exchange and emergency-based specialists. See infra note 69.
1
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that healthcare expenditures
will account for nearly 20% of GDP by 2020. Spending growth is set to outpace GDP growth
by 1.2% each year. Center For Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2016-2025 Projections of
National Health Expenditures Data Released (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroorn/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2017-Press-releases-items/2017-02-15-2 .html.

2

Writing for the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Steven Schroeder and Dr. William Frist,
who served on the National Commission on Physician Payment Reform, noted that "[c]ontrolling
rising expenditures for health care will not occur without changing the way that physicians are
paid." They further elaborated stating that "fixing current payment inequities under fee-for-service
models will be of the utmost importance." Steven Schroeder & William Frist, Phasing Out Fee-forService Payment, 368 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2029, 2030 (2013), http://¥.'WW.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMsb 1302322.
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This article explores MACRA's policy roots and history, analyzes how its current
regulatory implementation echoes past reform efforts, and sets forth recommendations
for easing the program's regulatory burden on providers while preserving Congress's
intended implementation of the legislation. It reasons that failure of the Sustainable
Growth Rate and other programs designed to control healthcare spending led to
MACRA's passage in 2015, and argues that MACRA's regulatory implementation
suffers from many of the same defects as its predecessors (namely inconsistent
implementation and umealistic expectations of the healthcare delivery and health
IT markets). Absent a change from CMS, implementation defects threaten the longterm viability of the statute and undermines its policy goals of improving quality and
controlling spending.

II. MACRA'S AND DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM'S HISTORY
A. The Sustainable Growth Rate Becomes Unsustainable

MACRA's history is rooted in a series of budget debates that took place in the 1990s. The
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 sought to balance the federal budget by cutting Medicare
expenditures. To do so, the Act implemented the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate
("SGR"). Designed to hold the growth of Medicare Part B expenditures in line with
GDP growth, SGR calculations were based on four factors:
1.

Estimated percentage changes in fees for physicians' services;

2.

Estimated percentage changes in the number of Medicare beneficiaries;

3.

Estimated change in GDP per capita; and,

4.

Estimated percentage change in expenditures due to changes in law
or regulations. 3

As the economy grew through the late nineties, doctors experienced moderate increases
in their FFS rates. However, when the economy slowed in 2000 and later years, these
increases turned into rate cuts under the SGR. Congress intervened by replacing
cuts to providers' FFS rates with small increases to physician payments. Following
Congressional intervention, the gap between the statute's target expenditures and
actual expenditures continued to grow. 4 Between 2003 and 2014, Congress passed
16 laws overriding the SGR's cuts due to annual physician outcry5 and the sudden

3

4

Balanced

of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4502-4503, 111Stat251, 432-434 (1997).

Conor Ryan, a statistician and data
math that led to the S.G.R.'s uu,u,,a.rnau1rny,

and
than

vA<1111 1J1<0, in a letter directed at Dave Camp and other members of the House of
Ke1ore:sentatJves the American Medical Association (AMA) sharply criticized members of the
House who did not support a bill to
the SGR because
services
to GDP would
lead to
reimbursement rates[.]" The AMA further
stated "[a]s nrerncreo. the SGR did result in a 4.8% cut in 2002. Congress declined and that cut went
into effect. ln
years, Congress did step in to prevent additional cuts from
The

2
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 12, Issue 2 •Spring 2018

negative adjustment on physician reimbursement rates. 6 As Congress continued to
delay Medicare spending cuts, lawmakers delivered a series of reforms designed to
reward doctors for controlling utilization while maintaining or improving the quality
of care. This series ofreforms measures clinicians from three aspects: (1) quality, (2)
the utilization or cost of patient care, and (3) process and technology. Lawmakers
incorporated these elements in three main programs: the Physician Quality Reporting
System ("PQRS"), the Value-based Modifier ("VBM"), and the Electronic Health
Record Incentive Program, commonly called "Meaningful Use." Each of these
programs adjusted physicians' reimbursement on Medicare claims based on their
performance on the programs' respective measures.
B. Quality Reporting Becomes Undermined by Complexity

In 2006, Congress authorized Medicare incentives for quality reporting through
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 7 and CMS implemented the statute by
creating the PQRS. The program underwent a series of statutory changes over time.
The Medicare, Medicaid, & SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 solidified the PQRS with
a permanent place in the reimbursement structure. 8 In 2010, the Affordable Care Act
("ACA") added another layer to PQRS by introducing penalties. Physicians who failed
to report quality data to CMS were penalized, and penalties continued to escalate on a
yearly basis. In tandem, the ACA ended PQRS incentives, converting the system into
a pure penalty program. 9
From a regulatory perspective, PQRS was complex. At its height, it required reporting
on nine separate clinical quality measures. 10 Physicians had to choose a measure
that was "cross-cutting," or broadly applicable to most specialties. There were also
guidelines on selecting "high priority measures," which specifically focused on quality
measures that had certain domain designations, such as "population management." 11
At its start, the program offered 74 total quality measures, a figure that eventually
increased to 281 total measures by the program's end. Further complicating matters,

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, the Medicare, Medicaid,
and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, and the Medicare Improvement for Patients Act of 2008 each
temporary relief for seniors and their
from
cuts. Letter from the ANIA
to Dave Camp, House of Representatives
6

Jim Hahn
out these laws
which includes several
The Sustainable Growth Rate (S G.R) and Medicare t'm1wrlfm

vv<Hu.m.u<is

7
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat 2922, 2975-2981
(1997).
8
Medicare, Medicaid, & SCRIP Extension Act of2007, Pub. L No. 110-173, § 101, 121 Stat
2492, 2494 (2007).

9
10

11

Affordable Care Act, Pub. L No. 111-148, § 3002, 124 Stat 119, 363 (2010).
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Sheet, 2 (2016).
Id.

Reporting
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physicians could report on quality measures using different submission mechanisms. 12
Initially, clinicians could report only on their Medicare claims using codes such as
Quality Data Codes ("QDCs") or G-Codes, and the claim code would have to tie
back to the appropriate diagnosis code or procedure code. Depending on the patient's
treatment plan, some measures involved a host of applicable CPT codes, G-codes, or
QDCs at the same time. 13
Later, CMS drastically expanded the available reporting mechanisms in response to
the industry's health information technology ("health IT") implementation. Eventually,
clinicians could opt to report measures via electronic health record ("EHR") or clinical
data registries. However, providers were unable to report each measure via all of the
available submission mechanisms. For example, one measure might be reportable only
through a registry, and another measure might only be reportable through an EHR. 14 The
number of measures available for each mechanism also varied. When CMS introduced
EHR-based reporting, there were only ten measures available for that mechanism. The
number of measures available for EHR-based reporting eventually expanded to 64 out
of 281 total measures. 15 If a provider desired to report on a different measure excluded
from the EHR-based reporting mechanism, they were required to select a claims-based
measure or purchase a registry connection in addition to the EHR. This could quickly
become a rather expensive and complex proposition depending on how a provider
wanted to participate.

12
Each year CMS published, and still does pursuant to MACRA, a list of quality measures
available for physicians to select. For example, for the 2016 performance period, the Physician
Fee Schedule listed measures available for Claims, registry, or EHR reporting. Medicare Program:
Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for
CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 71,216 (Nov. l 6, 2015).
13
CMS maintains a comprehensive list of Quality Measure Specifications and their supporting
documents. For a full listing of measure specifications used today, visit https://W1;vw.cms.gov/
Medicare/Quality-Payment-Program/Resource-Library/2018-Resources.html.
14
Physicians "choose" their quality measures through the Quality Payment Program's website
at https://qpp .cms.gov/mips/explore-measures/quality-measures?py=2018#measures. There,
a physician or practice manager generally filters by specialty to see what quality measures are
supported for their specific practice that year. Many fail to take the second step and filter by
submission mechanism. A mental health practitioner may filter by specialty and find that his or her
practice can choose both the Adult Major Depressive Disorder (MDD): Suicide Risk Assessment
measure or Adherence to Antipsychotic Medications for Individuals with Schizophrenia. However,
the former can only be reported through an EHR, and the latter can only be reported through a
registry. Whether a physician can use both measures depends on what technologies they have
purchased or licensed. This can be counterintuitive because the technology used to send measure
data to CMS is not clinically relevant, nor is it readily apparent why a clinical quality measure could
only be reported in one way.
15

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015 Reporting Experience Including Trends (20072015), 3 (2017).
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The effect of this complexity is evident in the number of clinicians who successfully
submitted data. Initially, only 15% of physicians participated voluntarily. 16 2015
marked the height of the PQRS program; participation was mandatory at that time. 17
Even then, over 30% of physicians took a penalty to their Medicare revenue instead
of participating in the reporting program. 18 For providers who chose to participate,
success varied based on the method of reporting. Physicians who reported using the
EHR successfully submitted nine measures more frequently than those reporting via
another mechanism. 19 Varying success rates between mechanisms was potentially
attributed to a provider's use of a single set of technology or employ of only one
system's workflows. 20 For example, most providers chose to have an EHR installed.
Those providers then used the EHR to capture data and used a registry to report the
captured data. This process required, at a minimum, multiple logins and portals. In
the most extreme circumstances, providers were required to conduct a manual chart
review to ensure that the data passing between the EHR and the registry was accurate.
Even those using EHR-based reporting experienced setbacks because the number of
EHR-based quality measures was severely limited compared to registry measures.
In 2017, Medicare's quality reporting only supported 53 EHR-based measures even
though there were 216 registry measures available. Overall, low participation rates
over the course of the program's lifespan were likely a result of the difficulties that
clinicians faced when completing the reporting process.
C. Health Information Technology and EHRs Suffer from Complex Measurement

Congress's incentive program eventually morphed into a penalty program, producing
EHRs. In 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Investment Act, Congress enacted
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act ("HITECH
Act"). When the law was passed, most patient records were recorded and stored on
paper. 21 Physicians appeared particularly resistant to adopting new technology,
16

Id. at xiv.

17

Id.

18

Id. at xiii.

19

96%
reporting
their EHR
reported on 9 or more measures,
fulfilling the program's requirement. Qualified Clinical Data Registries come in at a close second,
with 86% of their users
on 9 or more measures. From there, it's a steep drop to 39% via
~~,"-"~"J speaking, the manual effort involved in reconciling data increases with the number of
platforms used to communicate the same basic set of data. The technology platforms may read the
data in different ways, or record it using different vocabularies. To illustrate the problem properly,
imagine trying to transfer contact lists from one Apple phone to another. It is simple because both
phones use the same architecture. However, when migrating the same contact list from an Apple
phone to a Google phone, the transfer may result in duplicates, or contacts splitting into discrete
entries. Now imagine leaping from Apple, to Google, to Microsoft. Then the list is exported from
Microsoft to an Excel file. The fields are bound to be messy without manual manipulation of
the data at each transfer. Doctors face the same challenge. However, health information, namely
treatment, diagnosis, and payment data, is far more complex than the name, email, and phone
number fmmat of a basic contacts list
21

In 2009, only 48.3% of office-based
computerized
demographics,

had any EHR installed. A basic EHR, which
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particularly because no standardized electronic health record existed. In contrast,
Congress aimed to create a modem health IT infrastructure capable of delivering more
efficient, transparent, and timely care.
The HITECH Act created the "Meaningful Use" program as an incentive for providers
to acquire EHRs. 22 These incentives were calculated as a percentage increase in a
provider's Medicare or Medicaid revenue. 23 As applied to Medicaid, the program
was a pure incentive program. 24 CMS was responsible for overseeing the program
and defining the guidelines for how to measure Meaningful Use. Over the following
years, the Medicare Part B side of Meaningful Use morphed into a penalty program.
Physicians who did not "meaningfully use" technology lost a percentage of their
Medicare Part B revenue. 25 In application, the Meaningful Use program became
mandatory.
Meaningful Use was originally intended to take effect in incremental stages. 26 CMS
implemented the system as a pass/fail program with measure thresholds. A provider's
failure on one measure (out of roughly 8-10 total measures) caused the provider to fail
entirely. However, the regulatory implementation of Meaningful Use was inadequate,
and continued to decline when the program's penalties took effect. Manifold problems
added to the program's demise. For example, the patient engagement requirements
lacked reasonable thresholds. 27 Further, CMS frequently delayed changing
requirements, failing to recognize that the original deadlines for participation or
thresholds were patently too aggressive in the first place. 28 This scenario continued

for medications, and viewing lab results, was only present in 21.8% of physician offices. Officebased Physician Electronic Health Record Adoption, HEALTH lT DASHBOARD, https://dashboard.
healthitgov/quickstats/pages/physician-ehr-adoption-trends.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
22
23

HITECH Act, Pub. L No. 111-5, § 4101, 123 Stat 115, 467-468 (2009).
Id.

24

Id

25

Id. at§ 472.

26

Specifically, the HITECH act states that "[t]he Secretary shall seek to improve the use of
electronic health records and health care quality over time by requiring more stringent measures of
meaningful use[.]" Id. at § 470.
27
Meaningful Use Stage 2 originally required that 5% of all unique patients seen by an EP view,
dovvnload, or transmit their health record (VDT). Many providers expressed frustration with this
measure because it penalized providers for actions not always reasonably \Vithin their control. The
measure was later reduced to just one patient in response to the outcry. Medicare and Medicaid
Programs: Electronic Health Record Incentive Program - Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful
Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62789 (Oct 16, 2015).
28 In another example, CMS later released "Modified Stage 2," which required providers
to connect to a public health agency, clinical data registry, or specialty registry. This caused
industry-wide panic, as many providers did not plan to attest this way because it was not
initially required. CMS later pulled back this requirement, stating that if a provider had not
planned to attest to this requirement, they were excluded from the measure. This was done
through a fact sheet rather than formal rulemaking. EHR Incentive Programs in 2015: Alternate
Exclusions &
CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (2015), https://www.
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRincentiveProgram s/Downloads/2015 _
AlternateExclusionsandSpecifications.pdf

6
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 12, Issue 2 •Spring 2018

to play out through "Modified Stage 2." Stage 2 contained aggressive timelines that
were poorly received by physicians. To accommodate providers, CMS dramatically
changed the measure specifications and exclusions for years 2015-2017 through the
Modified Stage 2 regulation. However, these accommodations were undermined by
their delayed adoption because CMS took action in October of2015, about 10 months
into the 2015 performance period. 29 Finally, CMS consistently introduced incremental
flexibility through a series of exclusions from measures or objectives. 30 This flexibility
supplemented the complex nature of the program by adding exclusions and different
paths for disqualification from certain measures into an already complicated
measurement scheme.
In aggregate, these shortcomings had notable effects on the market. Physicians across
the country developed a distaste for EHRs. 31 Providers expressed frustration and
confusion with Meaningful Use's seemingly ever-changing requirements. Many did not
see a practical purpose in their EHR and wished to return to the era of paper charts. 32
Retirements spiked. 33 In the eyes of many clinicians, the program rendered the word
"meaningful" meaningless.
D. The Value-Based Modifier and the Cost of Patient Care
Congress established the Value-based Modifier ("VBM") through the Affordable Care
Act in 2010, one year after the passage of the HITECH Act. VBM represents Congress's
attempt to reward clinicians for controlling the cost of patient care while maintaining
quality. Similar to PQRS and Meaningful Use, the VBM plan furnished provider
payments two years after the applicable performance period. 34 CMS introduced VBM

29

80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62787 (Oct. 16, 2015).

30

The exclusions governing public health reporting are a good example of the complexity involved
in a single measure. The "general exclusions" of that measure provided that the measure did
not apply if 1) there was no registry in their jurisdiction ready to accept data, 2) if there was no
registry at all. Then there was a set of three specific exclusions that applied to the three sub-types of
registries, immunization registries, syndromic surveillance registries, and specialty registries. On top
of the complexity within this one measure, each other measure out of the 10 objectives in 2016 all
had 2-3 specific exclusions. 80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62820 (Oct. 16, 2015).
31

According to a 2017 survey by Medical Economics, 63% of users had a negative opinion of
their EHR. 2017 EHR Report Card, MEDICAL EcoNOMICS (Oct. 25, 2017), http://medicaleconomics.
modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/2017-ehr-report-card.
32

The former president of the AJV[A noted that "[t]he message from physicians is loud and clear:
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems have so much potential, but frustrating government
regulations have made them almost unusable." Steven J. Stack,
we
EHR
meaningful use isn t
AMA WIRE (July 21, 2015), https://wire.ama-assn.org/ama-news/
physicians-we-hear-you-ehr-meaningful-use-isnt-meaningful.
33

While there is a question of causality, the ONC noted that 41 % of providers who did not adopt
or plan to adopt an EHR cited retirement as their main reason. Office of the National Coordinator
for Health IT, Physician
Health Records (Dec. 2014) https://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/oncdatabrief-physician-ehr-adoption-motivators-2014.pdf.
34

Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3007, 124 Stat. 119, 373 (2010).
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by phasing the program in over the course of three years and applying it to physician
organizations of varying sizes depending on the performance period. 35
The program included a complex measurement process that leveraged an array of
data, including quality data received from the PQRS program, composite measures of
hospital admissions for acute and chronic conditions sensitive to ambulatory care, and
a measure of 30-day all-cause hospital readmissions. 36 Finally, to calculate cost, the
program implemented CMS claims data to calculate six separate measures, including:
(1) total per capita costs for all beneficiaries measure and total per capita costs for
beneficiaries with specific conditions, (2) diabetes, (3) coronary artery disease, (4)
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, (5) heart failure; and (6) Medicare spending per
beneficiary measure. 37
Because CMS calculated the VBM score through claims data aggregated after the
close of the performance period, physicians were largely unable to predict how their
cashflow would be impacted in later years because they could not fully assess their
performance in the present. Between 2011 and 2015, the administrative and reporting
burden ballooned. With the VBM, PQRS, and Meaningful Use combined, ambulatory
physicians were subject to no fewer than 25 measures that had different reporting
requirements, workflows, reporting deadlines, and portals.

III. 2015: MACRA USHERS IN A NEW ERA
2015 saw the dawn of a new era in healthcare reform through a rare act of bipartisanship.
SGR once again came into play as the politically toxic nature of the program motivated
Congress to change or repeal the law. At the same time, representatives received
numerous complaints from physician associations and technology vendors stating that
the various reporting programs were too complex and burdensome. 38 While Congress
desired to replace the SGR, it also wanted to leave in place a simplified regime that
could control costs to stabilize healthcare expenditures. Congress addressed these
concerns in the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. 39 The measure passed
overwhelmingly. 92 Senators and 392 Representatives from the House voted in favor of
theAct. 40

35

Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the
Fee Schedule and Other
Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 71,384 (Nov. 16, 2015).
36 ld.
37

Id. at 71,279.

38

The AMA submitted a detailed letter to CMS in October 2014 that
a
cm:11pr,ehensi·ve view
concerns prior to MACRA's passage. While focused on
Use, it calls out other programs such as PQRS. As a whole, the letter attacks ,,.~urn""''
Use's measure thresholds, lack
with other
programs, lack
crn:11pl<ex11y See Letter from the AMA to
R Tavenner, et al., Administrator For the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Oct 14, 2014).
39

MACRA, Pub. L No. 114-10, 129 Stat 87 (2015).

40

All Actions HR 2 - 114th Congress (2015-2016)
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In addition to repealing the SGR, MACRA created the Merit-based Incentive
Payment System ("MIPS"). 41 MIPS rolled PQRS, Meaningful Use, and the Valuebased Modifier into a single reporting program. Under MACRA, each category
was respectively labelled quality, meaningful use of certified EHR technology,
and resource use. 42 Congress also added a new element called Clinical Practice
Improvement Activities, which gave physicians credit for making clinical process
changes. 43 Under MACRA, Medicare reporting would have one deadline and a single
reporting portal. It would also be regulated through a single regulatory stream. All
in all, MACRA aimed to simplify the process of reporting quality data to Medicare.
In addition to easing the reporting process, the program authorized CMS to give
providers significant flexibility in the first two years of the program. 44 Most notably,
Congress gave CMS flexibility to set the composite score lower than the mean or
median of prior performance scores. 45
However, consolidation of the various programs came with senous financial
consequences. Over time, MIPS is set to become more financially aggressive. In 2017,
physicians faced incentives or penalties of 4% of their Medicare revenue. 46 After full
implementation occurs, physicians will face incentives or penalties of up to 9% of their
Medicare revenue. 47 For organizations whose payer mix consists of predominantly
Medicare beneficiaries, the incentives or penalties could represent the organization's
entire profit margin. 9% also presents a three percent increase in the net total financial
downside presented by PQRS, Meaningful Use, and the Value-Based Modifier. The
program is budget neutral48 (i.e. for every incentive dollar earned, another physician
receives a one-dollar penalty). Additionally, providers will be measured against the
mean or median of the market's overall performance. 49
Congress designed MIPS as a budget neutral program to create a business case
for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model ("APM"). Under an
Advanced APM, a provider shares the financial risk of the cost of patient care with
CMS. If the provider is capable of lowering the cost of care while maintaining quality,
CMS rewards the provider with a financial incentive. Alternatively, if the provider
fails to lower the cost, or does so by decreasing the quality of care, CMS punishes
the provider by imposing a financial penalty. The statute defines an Advanced APM
as a payment model based on the organization's undertaking of "more than nominal
risk." 50 This heightened financial risk usually occurs in the form of shared savings
or shared losses. In other words, CMS will share the government's savings with

41

43
44

Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 107.

45

IVJACR_/\, Pub. L. No.

46

Id. at

§ 101, 129 Stat 87, 106

5).

Id.
48
49

MACRA, Pub. L No. 114-10, §
Id.
107.

SIJ

Id.

129

87, ] 08 (2015).

119.
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healthcare providers who decrease CMS 's overall cost of patient care by reducing
hospitalizations, preventing health catastrophes, and providing proactive care. Instead,
if a provider costs CMS additional funds, the provider will pay a fraction of that cost
out to CMS and the broader healthcare system. 51 Designed to be a direct replacement
for the SGR, Congress hoped Advanced APMs and the MIPS penalty structure would
streamline and improve the reporting process.
Despite Congress's intention to simplify MAC RA and remove political uncertainty
from physician payments, providers have expressed hostility towards the program.
Lamenting about the financial components and the infancy of the program, many
physician organizations have resisted the program's implementation at each stage of
adoption. Notwithstanding MACRA's simplification in comparison to prior programs,
even the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has now recommended that
Congress replace MIPS with a simpler or voluntary altemative. 52 In response, the
authors of MAC RA indicated their expectation that CMS fully and faithfully implement
the statute. 53 Despite widespread pushback, MACRA is bolstered by bipartisan
buy-in and general dislike of the fee-for-service system. Relying on this supportive
base, it appears that MACRA is here to stay. As CMS proceeds with MACRA, it is
increasingly clear that the program's success depends on the details of implementation
and physician buy-in. However, inconsistent implementation, initial aggressive and
umealistic programmatic requirements, and late adjustments to those requirements
threaten the program's future.
IV. MACRA IN 2017 & 2018: WALKING IT BACK
A. 2017's Proposed Regulation: Panic in the Market

On May 9, 2016, CMS released the first in a series of proposed rules implementing
MIPS and the other provisions of MAC RA. Similar to the implementation of its legacy
programs, the rule set out aggressive requirements with significant financial impacts
for the first year. To begin, CMS required one full year of reporting. 54 If a physician
accepted more than $10,000 in Medicare revenue and cared for fewer than 100 Part B

51

See id.

52

Kate Bloniarz et al.,

Health

Services; and Moving

and
Payments: rm;.rn;um
the ,Merit-based Incentive Payment

MedPac (Jan. 11, 2018) http://v.rww.medpac.gov/docs/defaul1-source/default-documen1-library/jan2018-phys-mips-public.pdf?sfnsn=O.
53

A bipartisan group with members from multiple committees v,,Tote that "Congress
overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA).
We wTite to express the importance of successful implementation, as intended by Congress, of the
reforms included in MACRA and the establishment of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System
(MIPS) and Alternate Payment Model (APM) tracks for physician payment." Letter from Congress
Burwell, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Sept. 6, 2016),
16-EC.WM-MACRA-Letter.
54

Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive PayTHent System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment
Model (APM) Incentive under the
Fee Schedule, and Criteria for
Focused
Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162, 28,218 (May9, 2016).
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beneficiaries, they were subject to MIPS payment adjustments. 55 CMS summarized the
program's costs and benefits, estimating $833 million in negative adjustments and $833
million in positive adjustments over the first year; the adjustments would be spread out
over a range of 687 ,000 to 746,000 total "eligible clinicians."56
Generally, the statute commands CMS to set the performance threshold each year based
on the mean or median of the prior year's score. 57 For the first performance period, CMS
proposed an alternative threshold determination based on an analysis of Part B allowed
charges, 2014 and 2015 PQRS data submissions, feedback data on cost and quality, and
Meaningful Use program data. 58 Though the program took effect on January 1, 2017,
providers did not receive their first year target for the 2017 performance period until
October-December 2017.
In addition to obvious obstacles such as time compression, physicians also faced the
daunting task of understanding and adopting a new and complex MIPS scoring system.
CMS proposed a calculation of 50% for Quality, 25% for Advancing Care Information
(ACI) (the new regulatory designation for Meaningful Use), 15% for Clinical Practice
Improvement Activities, and 10% for Cost. However, each specific category required a
different number of total points in order for providers to earn full credit.
Quality scoring required reporting on six measures, including at least one outcomes
measure. 59 Providers had to earn a quality score of 60 points to receive a 100% in that
category. 60 Thus, earning 30 Quality points would supply a provider with 25% of their
MIPS composite score. CMS measured cost using the familiar Medicare Spending Per
Beneficiary measure, in conjunction with 14 new episode-based measures. 61
A new scoring category, Clinical Practice Improvement Activities, measured the
implementation of clinical process improvements called "improvement activities." In
the proposed rule, each activity was worth a certain number of points. Most practices
had to achieve 60 points to receive full credit in the Clinical Practice Improvement
Activities category. Small practices, or those with 15 eligible clinicians or fewer,
were only required to earn 30 points. 62 Under this category, there were "high priority"
activities worth 20 points (e.g. providing 24/7 access to the care team), and "medium
priority" activities worth 10 points (e.g. screening patients with certain mental health
conditions for depression). 63
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Next, the scoring scheme for Advancing Care Information (ACI) (previously referred to
as Meaningful Use) was, and remains, a tangled web of requirements. It was composed
of several elements, including a base score, performance score, and bonus score. 64
Although CMS announced that MIPS eliminated the arbitrary pass/fail elements of the
legacy programs, the elimination was not fully executed. The base score included a set
of 4-5 "required" measures, which consisted of a numerator and denominator. 65 The
numerator is the number of times a provider takes a particular action using technology,
and the denominator represents the number of encounters where that action is
presumably relevant. Under ACI, the provider had to earn a 1 in the numerator for these
"base" measures. 66 Providers who did not meet the base measures threshold failed the
entire category, echoing the pass/fail structure of Meaningful Use. 67 Because of the
low thresholds, CMS elected not to provide for exclusions in 2017. 68 Thus, providers
who did not write prescriptions, take referrals or receive transitions of care would fail
the entire category. 69 Providers who passed the base score would receive 50% of the
ACI score. To reach 100% under ACI (25% of the MIPS composite), providers had
to rely on performance score or "bonus score."70 The performance measures, which
sometimes overlapped with the base measures, were best explained as "the more you
do, the more you earn." 71 Finally, the bonus score rewarded physicians for connecting
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Even if a practice does take referrals or transitions of care, the health information exchange
measurement can be problematic. Imagine a retinal practice. Retinal medical issues are immediate
emergencies; if action is not taken within hours, the patient may become permanently blind. If most
patients are having a problem, they generally go to their optometrist or general ophthalmologist
before seeking alternative care. If the optometrist or ophthalmologist sees a retinal problem, they
will frequently arrange for an illlll1ediate evaluation with a retinal specialist, even walking the
patient across the street to the retinal specialist for immediate surgery. At no point is the referring
physician slowing down to send an electronic sunnnary of care. The retinal specialist is not going to
"query" or ask the referring physician's system for a sunnnary of care. Instead, the retinal specialist
will likely ask the physician and patient about the patient's current medications and potential
allergies before whisking the patient away to surgery. Even in the event of a specialist's request for
a srumnary of care, it may take days for the s1lllllllary to be completed and delivered. The referring
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private technology vendor like Surescripts. It is not maintained in NPPES, where all other provider
contact information and the NPis are kept, so there is no ruriversal source of truth.
70 Id
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to public health registries or reporting improvement activities through an EHR. 72
In aggregate, this amounted to a great deal of complexity to achieve only 25% of a
provider's score.
The program's complexity, rapid implementation, and perceived threat to small practices
provoked industry outcry. In response to the turmoil, the American Medical Association
(AMA) released a 70-page comment letter about the proposed regulation. The letter
specifically advocated for a transitional period of reduced thresholds, seeking "a much
more progressive and welcoming environment."73 The American Academy of Family
Physicians (AAFP) used stronger language, stating that "we see a strong and definite
need and opportunity for CMS to step back and reconsider the approach to this proposed
rule which we view as overly complex and burdensome[.]"74 Both organizations
called for an interim rule to scale back many of the proposed rule's provisions. The
American Hospital Association (AHA) also weighed in, "urg[ing] CMS to monitor
ongoing feedback of the field to implement MACRA, and to be willing to consider
additional flexibility in its timeline and other requirements such as quality measure data
completeness."75 Specialist societies lent their voices as well. The American College
of Cardiology (ACC) called for CMS to "streamline and simplify" the program, 76
while the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) noted that "it will be
burdensome, if not impossible for physicians to get ready for the first performance year
of2017." 77
Physician organizations were not alone in their criticism of the proposed rule. Technology
vendors who supported MACRA's reporting and data collection requirements were
equally concerned. The EHRA requested that "CMS take every possible step to
dramatically simplify provisions and requirements, and to revise and develop providerfocused communications to reduce remaining perceived complexity."78 The EHRA
further requested 18 months of additional development time to support quality
measures. 79 The Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS),
representing a broader swathe of the health IT market, noted that the timeline was
problematic because vendors supporting the program would need to change measure/
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dashboard logic and user interfaces. 80 tenuous response as it became apparent that the
market was not prepared for the ambitious proposed rule.
B. Walking Back from Full Implementation to the Transition Years
In response to overwhelming criticism, CMS drastically walked back its implementation
of MIPS, echoing the Meaningful Use and EHR Incentive Programs. Most notably, CMS
removed most of the program's financial consequences for the 2017 performance period.
CMS changed the performance threshold by setting it at 3 points out of 100 instead
of basing the threshold on the legacy programs' prior scores. This change had several
financial impacts. First, in order to avoid a penalty, providers had to report on fewer
measures than in prior years. CMS provided four "Pick Your Pace," reporting options:

1.

Do nothing, and receive a 4% penalty;

2.

Report on at least one quality measure, the required Advancing Care
Information measures, or one improvement activity for at least 90 days
to avoid any penalty;

3.

Report on more than one quality measure, the required Advancing Care
Information measures, or one improvement activity for at least 90 days
and earn a small incentive; or

4.

Fully report for a full calendar year and earn an incentive. 81

In addition, CMS significantly expanded the list of providers who would receive an
exclusion from the program. Under the new structure, a physician would be excluded
from MIPS if they collected less than $30,000 in Medicare revenue or saw fewer
than 100 Medicare patients. 82 Because CMS lowered the performance threshold
and expanded exclusions, the total estimate of incentives and penalties for the 2017
performance period was $199 million spread across at least 592,000 clinicians. 83 The
new structure reduced MIPS incentives and penalties to an average of only $336.15 per
clinician program.
The new and improved 2018 MAC RA rule continues the trend of expanding exclusions.
The rule extends the transition period by another year while adding complexity and
untested features to MIPS through the introduction of improvement scoring, virtual
group reporting and new exclusions. The rule also raises the performance threshold to
15 points out of 100. 84 To avoid a penalty, providers can take several pathways, including
but not limited to:
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1.

Report on six clinical quality measures;

2.

Report on the required ACI measures and one quality measure; or,

3.

Fully participate in Clinical Practice Improvement Activities, which
entails one to two process changes to receive full credit.

Despite increasing the performance threshold, CMS further expanded the list of
available exclusions to include providers seeing fewer than 200 patients or taking less
than $90,000 in revenue. 85 Under the expanded exclusions, fewer clinicians will be
penalized. With fewer providers paying penalties into the program, the total amount of
incentive money available to participating providers will decrease to $118 million. 86 As
a result, clinicians who were subject to the program in 2017 may be excluded in 2018.
Moreover, when CMS proposed the 2018 rule, it introduced another element of
complexity to the program by permitting virtual group reporting. This technically
complex new reporting scheme allows organizations with 10 or fewer eligible clinicians
to report as a single entity. 87 While it presumably enables smaller organizations to scale
in the same manner as enterprise healthcare systems, different practices in a virtual
group will likely use different EHRs. CMS did not release any guidance on how data
would be submitted for virtual groups that use different EHRs.
The rule also introduced "improvement scoring," where an organization could
receive extra credit for improving Quality and Cost. However, CMS measures
quality improvement at the category level. 88 This means that CMS would measure
the improvement a provider made on the average of all measures selected, rather
than the individual measures themselves. Given the high level of variance between
quality measures, CMS even noted that this could leave improvement scoring open to
gamesmanship. 89
Finally, CMS also reintroduced exclusions for Advancing Care Information, and
retroactively applied the exclusions to the 2017 performance period Gust 2 months
before the closure of that performance period). 90 Introducing new exclusions at this
time-sensitive juncture left many developers with insufficient time to support providers,
leaving the dashboards of some providers technically unsupported. This regulatory
inconsistency and complexity between 201 7 and 2018 has set an uncertain stage for the
future of MAC RA.
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V. WHAT'S NEXT AND MAXIMIZING PROGRAMMATIC EFFICACY
AND EFFICIENCY
Despite MACRA's challenging regulatory implementation, stabilizing programmatic
implementation in the coming years will allow CMS to maximize the program's
efficacy and gain buy-in from physicians. MIPS has already made several important
improvements over its legacy programs, including a single reporting deadline and a
reporting portal that displays a provider's live score before the submission period
closes. 91 CMS also recently announced two initiatives aimed at gaining provider support.
First, the Meaningful Measures project seeks to reorient quality measures to provide
less emphasis on process and have a greater focus on clinical outcomes.9 2 CMS has also
launched Patients Over Paperwork, a program meant to implement President Trump's
executive order to "cut the red tape." One of its primary and most laudable goals is to
reduce the administrative time physicians spend on compliance with CMS programs,
such as MIPS. In a recent newsletter, CMS stated that the new reporting portal and the
removal of several quality measures are by-products of that initiative. 93
Plus, MIPS' scoring is already an improved version of the scoring systems implemented
in the legacy programs. One example of this improvement is the fundamental removal
of thresholds from Meaningful Use under ACI. Before, Meaningful Use was a pass/fail
program with different thresholds for different measures. 94 Today's program is more
comparable to a performance category. Additionally, the removal of a cross-cutting
quality measure will help specialists more effectively participate, specifically in the
Quality category ofMIPS.95
However, more work remains if CMS wants to regain physicians' confidence that
MACRA will be more than just a reporting program where they must memorize a myriad
ofrequirements. Two changes are integral to the program's future: reducing complexity
and lengthening the regulatory cycle to the extent permitted by law. Acting with input
from the AMA and other provider organizations, Congress has already provided CMS
with the vehicle to accomplish these changes96 by pushing mean and median scoring
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from 2019 to 2022. 97 To accommodate this scoring change and provide a more natural
onramp, CMS must gradually increase the performance threshold for the next three
years. CMS must release new cost measures by December 31, 2018, with the option
to weigh Cost between 10% and 30% (before, it was set to scale to 30% in 2019). 98 In
another effort to introduce more simplicity, Congress removed improvement scoring
from the program until 2022. 99
CMS should also take further action to simplify scoring. Under ACI today, providers
can earn up to 100%, which then represents 25% of their MIPS composite score. CMS
defines full participation in the Quality category as reporting on six quality measures
with at least one outcomes measure, a data submission threshold of 60%. 100 The top
Quality score is 60 points, and represents 50% of a provider's score. 101 Clinical Practice
Improvement Activities contain high priority measures worth 20 points, medium priority
measures worth 10 points, and a 40 point or 20 point maximum that, depending on
practice size, represents 15% of the provider's total MIPS composite score. 102 This is a
tremendously complex scoring scheme that all practices must contend with, regardless
of their size or sophistication. Varying the maximum scores in each category and
eliminating nuances such as performance scores and base scores would further simplify
the program.
CMS should also provide greater consistency and simplicity in terms to aid provider
understanding. As noted earlier, ACI contains a reference to a base score, performance
score, and a bonus score. 103 For a physician or practice administrator who will not read
the entirety of the regulation, the difference between a bonus score and performance
score is difficult to understand. CMS 's decision to change or replace commonly used
terms also presents difficulties to participating providers. CMS adopted the term "eligible
clinician," a change from MACRA's statutory use of "eligible provider." Morphing the
term Meaningful Use into ACI, while applying identical measure specifications, also
caused needless confusion. CMS should avoid unnecessary changes in terminology
and consider changing ACI to "MIPS Meaningful Use." This term more accurately
describes the category, aligns the category with the terminology in the MACRA statute
and allows providers to better understand of the term due to their previous experience
with Meaningful Use.
Finally, the broader market would benefit tremendously from extending the regulatory
cycle and stabilizing implementation. Allowing some providers to claim an exclusion
after participating in 2017 will cause providers to overlook the program based on a
belief that it lacks tenacity. Then, if exempt providers become subject to MAC RA once
97
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again, they will be disillusioned and ultimately disinclined to participate. CMS should
not implement further raises to the exclusionary thresholds. If CMS chooses to lower
the thresholds, the agency should engage in significant education efforts so providers
are not "blindsided" by the new exclusion guidelines. Moreover, CMS should start
proposing new measures and exclusions eighteen months before implementation (rather
than six). This extended implementation period would give providers enough time to
familiarize themselves with new concepts. It would also provide technology vendors
with additional time to support provider participation in MACRA through development
of functionality tools such as updated dashboards and optimized EHR workflows.

VI. CONCLUSION
MACRA is a rare bipartisan achievement that streamlines prior programs while
attempting to create a business case for changing the way the federal government pays
providers. However, the program's success ultimately depends on its implementation. If
CMS can administer the program in a way that allows physicians to buy in, it stands a
much greater chance of success. Prior programs suffered because of inconsistent, uneven,
and complex measurement. MACRA's first two years have echoed those prior reform
efforts. Avoiding the historical pitfalls ofMACRA's predecessors will allow the program
to succeed. Important improvements that should be integrated into MACRA over the
coming year include lengthening the regulatory cycle, simplifying the requirements,
and consistent implementation. These improvements will ensure achievement of the
legislation's original intent while also providing for the program's overall success.
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